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A Modest Proposal 
THE AGED OF DEATH ROW SHOULD BE DEEMED 
TOO OLD TO EXECUTE* 
Elizabeth Rapaport† 
INTRODUCTION 
Clarence Ray Allen was seventy-six years old when he 
was executed in California in 2006.1 The State of California 
disputed Allen’s claims that he was handicapped and greatly 
diminished by the infirmities of age.2 He used a wheelchair, 
had endured both a heart attack and a stroke, was diabetic, 
and claimed to be legally blind.3 The press coverage of his 
execution made prominent mention of the fact that Allen did 
indeed walk to the death chamber although supported by 
guards, inviting the inference that he was a malingerer and 
had exaggerated the toll of age and ill health.4 A deeper look 
into the record reveals that he was escorted to the death 
chamber by four burly guards, with whose support a paraplegic 
could also have covered the short distance without other aid.5 
The United States has a growing elderly death row 
population; they are beginning to trickle into the execution 
chamber. The Supreme Court has several times rebuffed efforts 
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 1 Inmates Executed, 1978 to Present, CAL. DEPARTMENT CORRECTIONS & 
REHABILITATION, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Capital_Punishment/Inmates_Executed.html 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2012).  
 2 See Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 955 (9th Cir. 2006).  
 3 Peter Fimrite, Allen Is First of Many Sick, Aged in Line at Death Row, S.F. 
CHRON., Jan. 15, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/ 
c/a/2006/01/15/MNGBQGNOU31.DTL&ao=all.  
 4 Kevin Fagan, Allen Managed to Walk to Execution Gurney: In Final 
Moments, Killer Didn’t Seem So Frail, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 18, 2006, at A1, available at 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/01/18/MNG9IGP0I91.DTL&ao=all. 
 5 Id. 
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to gain Eighth Amendment protection from execution for the 
long-serving condemned irrespective of their age, denying 
certiorari to the Lackey claim. The Lackey claim urges that the 
combination of long confinement in anticipation of death and 
execution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited 
by the Eighth Amendment. The chilly reception of the Lackey 
claim by the Supreme Court is best explained not by its lack of 
merit but rather by the devastating impact its recognition 
would have on capital punishment. Execution in the United 
States follows condemnation on average by more than a dozen 
years. Hundreds of death row inmates have not had their cases 
finally resolved twenty and thirty years after sentences were 
pronounced. The ranks of the long serving are steadily growing. 
Recognizing the Lackey claim would take the United States a 
long way down the road to abolition. The Supreme Court has 
been inhospitable to total abolition but willing to reform capital 
punishment by trimming back the types of crimes and 
criminals eligible for capital punishment. Unlike the general 
Lackey claim, Lackey-for-the-Elderly is another such modest 
reform. Lackey-for-the-Elderly is therefore more likely to 
succeed than the wider claim. Its adoption would bring an end 
to a practice that the Eighth Amendment ought not tolerate. It 
would spare us the spectacle of the elderly being carried or 
wheeled to the execution chamber after decades of growing old 
in death row confinement in the name of American justice. 
My exploration of the case for an Eighth Amendment bar 
against executing the long-serving elderly will begin with a 
review of the representation of the elderly on America’s death 
rows and a survey of the very limited avenues of relief currently 
available to them on the basis of age. I will then discuss the 
attribution problem by asking at whose door should “fault” for 
long delays between condemnation and consummation of a 
capital sentence be laid—the prisoner, the state, or the working 
through of due process? For many jurists, attribution of fault is 
critical to resolving the question of whether the long serving of 
any age should be permitted to exit death row alive. I will then 
argue that the long-serving elderly should be relieved of both 
death row confinement and the continuing threat of execution.  
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I. LACKEY-FOR-THE-ELDERLY: A PROPOSAL FOR AN EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT BAR TAILORED FOR ELDERLY DEATH ROW 
INMATES 
A prohibition against execution of the long-serving 
elderly would amount to an age-specific version of the Lackey 
claim. The Lackey claim takes its name from the eponymous 
Clarence Lackey. In Lackey v. Texas, Lackey argued that after 
seventeen years on death row his execution would be cruel and 
unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.6 The 
Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari in 1995. 
Justice Stevens wrote a memorandum to the denial of 
certiorari stating that the question Lackey raised warranted 
review, but should be allowed to percolate through the lower 
courts before certiorari was granted.7 Since Lackey, the 
Supreme Court has rebuffed a handful of similar petitions over 
dissents from Justice Breyer from the denial of certiorari and 
renewed statements by Justice Stevens that the Court should 
in due course grant a Lackey petition and consider the issue on 
its merits.8 The Lackey claim, although a staple in end-game 
capital litigation, has yet to prevail in any U.S. court under the 
Eighth Amendment or its analogs in the constitutions of the 
thirty-four states that retain capital punishment.9 The Lackey 
claim may well roil both abolitionists and retentionists. 
Abolitionists may fear a time limit would portend a rush to 
execute before the deadline. Retentionists may fear that a time 
limit would be so great a curb on executions as to amount to 
abolition, given a national average in excess of twelve years to 
accomplish execution. The apprehension of the two camps will 
be addressed in this article. 
  
 6 Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995).  
 7 Id. 
 8 See, e.g., id.; Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541, 542 (2009); Thompson v. 
McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1299, 1303 (2009); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002); 
Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999); Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 
(1998). In Thompson v. McNeil, Stevens broke with his practice of stating the issue 
deserved a future hearing on the merits and proclaimed his support for granting the 
petition. 129 S. Ct. at 1299. Petitioner Thompson had been on Florida’s death row for 
thirty-two years. Id.  
 9 In Knight v. Florida, Justice Thomas notes that federal and state courts 
considering Lackey claims since Lackey v. Texas “have resoundingly rejected the claim.” 
Knight, 528 U.S. at 992 (Thomas, J., concurring). But see People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 
880, 894-95 (Cal. 1972) (holding capital punishment to be unconstitutional under the 
California Constitution in part because of delays in carrying out sentences). 
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Lackey claims ripen when a prisoner confronts an 
execution date.10 The Lackey petitioner then argues that the 
imposition of execution on the heels of the long death row 
confinement constitutes excessive punishment prohibited by 
the Eighth Amendment. These petitions also urge that long-
term death row confinement may itself constitute cruel 
punishment. Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer are clearly in 
sympathy with both theses.11 Some international courts and the 
constitutional courts of some nations have held that a lengthy 
period awaiting execution constitutes cruelty and have required 
that prisoners be spared exposure to extended periods of time 
under sentence of death quite apart from the imminence of the 
threat of execution.12 Because of their inevitable frailties, 
constitutional questions about long-term confinement and 
subsequent execution arise in an acute form when we focus on 
the aged of death row. No attempt will be made here to specify 
precisely the geriatric threshold that would trigger the 
protection of a Lackey-for-the-Elderly regime—whether 
chronological age or deterioration and vulnerability associated 
with aging processes. Such practical considerations can be left 
for the time at which the Eighth Amendment questions raised 
here have gained the ear of the American bench. 
The question of whether the Eighth Amendment should 
afford shelter to the aged of death row can be parsed into two 
related inquiries. First, is it prohibited cruelty to confine 
persons beyond a certain chronological age, or those exhibiting 
the deterioration associated with old age, in death row 
conditions? And second, is it prohibited cruelty to execute aged 
condemned prisoners? Of these two issues, the first may 
perhaps be more readily acknowledged as raising a valid 
Eighth Amendment issue: whatever conclusion one might 
ultimately reach on the question, the proposition that death 
row conditions exact a greater toll on the physically and 
mentally frail or infirm does not appear controversial. I will 
argue that the Eighth Amendment should be construed to 
  
 10 Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1998) (Fletcher, J., dissenting).  
 11 Johnson, 130 S. Ct. 541 (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J., mem. respecting 
denial of cert.); Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., mem. respecting 
denial of cert.).  
 12 Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 44 (1989) (holding 
that extradition of a defendant to Virginia where he would face years on death row if 
capitally sentenced constituted a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights); Pratt v. Jamaica, (1994) 2 AC 1 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Ct. App. 
Jam.) (holding that a delay of fourteen years before carrying out an execution violated 
section 17(1) of the Jamaican Constitution). 
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relieve the elderly condemned from both death row 
incarceration and the long-serving elderly condemned from the 
continued threat of execution—thus, Lackey-for-the-Elderly.  
II. THE AGED OF DEATH ROW BY THE NUMBERS 
It will be useful to begin by examining the facts and 
statistics that reveal the extent of the elderly population on 
death row and the reasons for its continuing growth. This 
exercise will demonstrate that there are good reasons to expect 
that courts and prison administrations will be confronting what 
to do with the aged condemned not as an occasional anomaly but 
as a recurrent issue in death-penalty law and practice. 
Clarence Ray Allen was the fourth septuagenarian to be 
executed since 2004.13 A fifth was executed in 2010.14 Three men 
sixty-five or older have also been executed since 2002.15 Prior to 
2002 only one person sixty-five or older, a sixty-six-year-old, 
had been executed in the entire history of the modern death-
penalty era commencing with the reinstatement of capital 
punishment in 1976. That execution occurred in 1984.16 
These executions of persons in their late sixties and 
seventies reflect the graying of death row. In 2000, only 2.3 
percent of death row prisoners were sixty or older; 11.1 percent 
were fifty to fifty-nine.17 In 2009, 2.6 percent were sixty-five or 
older and 5.6 percent between sixty and sixty-four; 21.1 percent 
were age fifty to fifty-nine.18  
 
 
 
 
  
 13 The other over-seventy prisoners executed were James Hubbard, age 
seventy-four, executed August 5, 2004, in Alabama; John Nixon, age seventy-seven, 
executed December 14, 2005, in Mississippi; and John Boltz, age seventy-four, executed 
June 1, 2006, in Oklahoma. Death Penalty Information Center, Execution Database, 
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2011). 
 14 Gerald Holland, age seventy-two, was executed in Mississippi on May 20, 
2010. Id. 
 15 Id.  
 16 Id.  
 17 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 1999, at 9 tbl.8 (2000) [hereinafter CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1999], available 
at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp99.pdf. 
 18 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT, 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 9 tbl.5 (2010) [hereinafter CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 2009], available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp09st.pdf. 
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Table 1: Percentage of Death Row Prisoners over Age 
Fifty in the United States19  
 
 
 
Table 2: Number of Death Row Prisoners over Age Fifty 
in the United States20 
 
 
  
 19 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1999, supra note 17; CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2009, 
supra note 18. 
 20 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2009, supra note 18, at 9 tbl.5. 
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The reason for this change is not a wave of capital crimes 
by the elderly.21 Rather, it is one awkward consequence of the 
contemporary capital punishment regime. A capital sentence 
marks the beginning of a potentially decades-long incarceration.22 
Final resolution of capital cases—whether by execution or 
sentence reduction and removal to general prison population—
can take decades, and for many long-serving inmates, resolution 
has not yet come. In this system, a modest 15 percent of persons 
sentenced to die since 1977 have been executed, while more than 
40 percent of those sent to death row at any time from 1977 
forward are still there and growing older.23  
 
Table 3: Average Elapsed Time from Sentence to 
Execution (Years)24
 
 
 
  
 21 Id. This table shows that while 29.3 percent of prisoners on death row in 
2009 were over fifty, these prisoners represented only 14.4 percent of the additions to 
death row that year.  
 22 Id. at 12 tbl.9 & 14 tbl.12. Table 9 shows that in 2009, the average death 
row prisoner had been on death row for 152 months, or approximately 12.6 years. Table 
12 shows that the average time between sentencing and execution in 2009 was 169 
months, or 14.1 years.  
 23 Id. at 16 tbl.14.  
 24 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT, 2008—STATISTICAL TABLES (2009) [hereinafter CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2008], 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp08st.pdf; CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2009, 
supra note 18. 
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Almost all the states that lead the country in number 
and frequency of executions as well as the less execution-prone 
death-penalty states have elderly death row inmates.25 These 
inmates include people condemned in their fifties and sixties, 
but the majority of these older death row inmates have been on 
death rows for twenty, twenty-five, and thirty years.26 Thus, 
state and federal courts and clemency authorities can expect to 
confront the issue of whether to proceed with the execution of 
aged inmates long incarcerated on death row with increasing 
frequency in the years to come.  
Old age comes early to prison populations, because the 
population is unhealthy at entry and prison conditions are 
generally inimical to physical and mental health.27 In an era 
when “sixty is the new forty” for free Americans, prison health 
experts treat the onset of old age in prison as commencing as 
early as fifty.28 No legislature has enacted capital punishment 
as a sentence expressly to include decades spent ripening into 
old age on death row, but death sentences in almost every 
death-penalty jurisdiction now have that potential—and for a 
growing number of inmates, that reality.29 Relative to the 
conditions of the general prison population, the more rigorous 
conditions of confinement on death row take a greater toll on 
  
 25 Several of the most active death penalty states have prisoners over sixty. 
For example, as of February 2011, six of Georgia’s ninety-eight death row prisoners 
were over age sixty. GA. DEP’T CORR., INMATE STATISTICAL PROFILE: UNDER DEATH 
SENTENCE (2011), available at http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/Research/Monthly/Profile_ 
death_row_2011_02.pdf. As of March 23, 2011, fifteen of Ohio’s 156 death row inmates 
are over sixty. Death Row Inmates, OHIO DEP’T REHABILITATION & CORRECTION, 
http://www.drc.ohio.gov/public/deathrow.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2011). As of March 27, 
2011, five of Alabama’s 203 death row inmates were over sixty. Alabama Inmates 
Currently on Death Row, ALA. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, http://www.doc.state.al.us/ 
deathrow.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). As of March 1, 2011, one of South Carolina’s 
fifty-five death row inmates was over sixty. S.C. DEP’T OF CORR., LIEBER CORRECTIONAL 
INSTITUTION: DEATH ROW ROSTER (2012), available at http://www.doc.sc.gov/news/ 
deathrowlist.pdf. As of March 27, 2011, fifty of Florida’s 394 death row prisoners were over 
sixty. Death Row Roster, FLA. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/activeinmates/ 
deathrowroster.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2011).  
 26 As of December 31, 2009, 196 of California’s 684 death row prisoners (or 
approximately 28.7 percent) had been under sentence of death for more than twenty 
years. In Florida, 117 out of 389 (or approximately 30 percent) death row prisoners had 
been on death row for more than twenty years. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2009, supra note 
18, at 19 tbl.18.  
 27 Ronald H. Aday, Golden Years Behind Bars: Special Programs and 
Facilities for Elderly Inmates, 58 FED. PROBATION 47 (1994). 
 28 Timothy Curtin, The Continuing Problem of America’s Aging Prison 
Population and the Search for a Cost-Effective and Socially Acceptable Means of 
Addressing It, 15 ELDER L.J. 473 (2007). 
 29 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2008, supra note 24, at 14 tbl.11; see also Richard Willing, 
Death Row Population Is Graying, USA TODAY (Feb. 11, 2005), http://www.usatoday.com/ 
news/nation/2005-02-09-elder-death_x.htm.  
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the minds and bodies of these inmates and therefore 
exacerbate the decline and distress of older prisoners.30 These 
conditions include severely limited opportunities for exercise or 
work, social isolation, lack of stimulation and contact with the 
world beyond prison gates, and, in particular, lack of contact 
with family and friends.31 To these conditions must be added 
the background condition of living with the prospect of 
execution.32 
III. CURRENTLY AVAILABLE RELIEF 
An aged death row inmate has at the present time two 
potential avenues of relief that address his or her age. If he is 
far into senility, he can argue—in the parlance of the common 
law—that he is no longer of sound memory. Ford v. Wainwright 
constitutionalized this common law rule by holding that the 
execution of a person incapable of understanding that he is 
being executed for committing a heinous crime is forbidden by 
the Eighth Amendment.33 Ford was argued in habeas petitions 
by two of the executed septuagenarians.34 Although a Ford 
claim has yet to prevail, if States continue to execute persons of 
such advanced age, some Ford claims will eventually succeed. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals offers a second avenue of 
relief, available to death row prisoners befuddled by age but 
not lost in advanced senility. In Rohan ex rel. Gates v. 
Woodford, the court recognized a statutory right to be 
competent to assist counsel in capital habeas cases.35 A death 
row inmate who cannot rationally communicate with habeas 
counsel may stay habeas proceedings and execution. The 
  
 30 JEREMY L. WILLIAMS, THE AGING INMATE POPULATION: SOUTHERN STATES 
OUTLOOK (2006), available at http://www.slcatlanta.org/Publications/HSPS/aging_ 
inmates_2006_lo.pdf; see also ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CMA, INCARCERATING ELDERLY 
AND AGING INMATES: MEDICAL AND MENTAL HEALTH IMPLICATIONS, available at 
http://www.doh.state.fl.us/cma/reports/agingreport.pdf (“Because of the impact of lifestyle, 
medical care, and environmental factors in the aging process, correctional agencies 
should adopt age 50 as the chronological starting point for defining elderly offenders.”).  
 31 Robert Johnson, Under Sentence of Death: The Psychology of Death Row 
Confinement, 5 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 141, 142-43 (1979) (discussing the physical and 
psychological effects of death row confinement).  
 32 Kate McMahon, Dead Man Waiting: Death Row Delays, the Eighth 
Amendment and What Courts and Legislatures Can Do, 25 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 43 
(2007) (discussing “death row phenomenon”).  
 33 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
 34 Clarence Ray Allen and James Hubbard both presented this argument in 
their habeas corpus petitions. See Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2006); 
Hubbard v. Campbell, 379 F.3d 1245 (11th. Cir. 2004).  
 35 Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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Rohan decision makes it possible to remove some elderly from 
death row before a Ford claim would be ripe and on a less 
demanding standard. In his opinion in Rohan, Judge Kozinski 
in effect reduced the standard on which a prisoner can stay 
execution from the very demanding Ford standard to the Dusky 
standard of incompetent to assist counsel.36 The stay would 
necessarily be permanent in the case of a habeas petitioner 
with irreversible loss of mental function.37 For example, Leroy 
Nash, the oldest inmate on death row at ninety-four years old 
until his death in 2010, won a stay when the court of appeals 
extended the right to be competent to assist counsel in capital 
habeas cases to appeals from denials of habeas.38 In Nash v. 
Ryan, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals clarified the standard 
to be applied, namely, “whether rational communication with 
the petitioner is essential to counsel’s ability to meaningfully 
prosecute an appeal.”39 Leroy Nash subsequently left death row 
and died in a medical facility.40 Nash may be the first death row 
inmate to exit death row because he was too old to execute.  
However, both Ford and Rohan can afford relief only to 
the elderly seriously compromised in their mental function. 
What of the more mentally fit elderly marking off the decades 
on death row? What are the prospects for a constitutional 
categorical exclusion of the elderly from execution after long 
incarcerations on death row?41  
  
 36 Id. at 816-17.  
 37 To date, no other federal circuit has either followed or rejected Rohan. 
However, in Holmes v. Buss, Judge Posner bolstered the Rohan analysis although he 
found it unnecessary to either accept or reject Rohan because its “validity has 
throughout these proceedings been assumed rather than litigated.” 506 F.3d 576, 578 
(7th Cir. 2007). He elaborated Judge Kozinski’s defense of the standard of rational 
communication with counsel as appropriate in habeas, and discussed prosecutorial 
misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel as examples of where a lay defendant’s 
recollections may well assist habeas counsel. Id. at 579-80.  
 38 Nash v. Ryan, 581 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 39 Id. at 1054. 
 40 Oldest U.S. Death Row Inmate Dies Aged 94, BBC NEWS (Feb. 14, 2010, 
10:10 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/8515573.stm. 
 41 The exclusion under discussion would not bar capital adjudication of 
persons who kill at an advanced age. Such a bar would be analogous to that recognized 
for youthful murderers in Roper v. Simmons. Rather, the nature of the exclusion 
explored in this article is analogous to that in Ford v. Wainwright prohibiting the 
execution of a prisoner convicted and capitally sentenced who subsequently becomes 
incompetent to execute by virtue of insanity. Unlike the Ford prohibition, there would 
be no possibility that the aged prisoner would be restored to fitness and executable, 
unless medical advances allow the processes of aging to be reversed. 
2012] A MODEST PROPOSAL 1099 
IV. THE ATTRIBUTION PROBLEM: WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR 
DELAY IN CONSUMMATING EXECUTIONS? 
A proponent of any type of Lackey claim must address 
the attribution problem that has bedeviled discussions of the 
issue (for death row prisoners of any age) in domestic, foreign, 
and international courts; for many readers attribution would 
be the essential starting point of a Lackey discussion, if not the 
heart of the matter. At whose door should responsibility for 
delay be placed? Should it be charged to legal maneuvering by 
the prisoner to delay execution of a sentence, the normal course-
of-review processes, or dilatory (or worse) conduct by the state? 
Judges throughout the world have wrestled with the attribution 
question. They have differed sharply as to the proper attribution 
of responsibility for delay and the inferences to be drawn as to 
whether the human or constitutional rights of prisoners have 
been violated. Justice Stevens took the position on attribution in 
Lackey—to which he and Justice Breyer have subsequently 
adhered—that prisoners should not be held responsible for 
delays caused by state “negligence or deliberate action,”42 or “a 
petitioner’s legitimate exercise of his right of review.”43 However, 
these justices would debit delay caused by “abuse of the judicial 
system by escape or repetitive, frivolous[] filings” in calculating 
time on death row that may require relief.  
Justice Thomas rejected this analysis in his 
concurrences in the Lackey cases, in which a spirited serial 
debate has transpired between pro-Lackey Justices Stevens 
and Breyer and anti-Lackey Justice Thomas. Justice Thomas is 
among those judges who lose patience when asked to consider 
delay as cruelty visited on prisoners that may support an 
Eighth Amendment claim. Particularly when there has been a 
confession, Justice Thomas is disposed to argue that the 
prisoner could avoid delay by submitting to his sentence.44 
Perhaps the emphasis on conceded guilt relieves the justice of 
any acknowledged need to consider the weight of delay in 
supporting a petition when the State has been negligent or 
  
 42 Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995).  
 43 Id.  
 44 Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1301 (2009); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 
990, 991 (2002). Having noted that Foster was a confessed murderer who could have 
avoided delay by submitting to his sentence, Justice Thomas adds, “Moreover, this 
judgment [on Foster by the people of Florida] would not have been made had petitioner 
not slit Julian Lanier’s throat, dragged him into the bushes, and then, when petitioner 
realized he could hear Lanier breathing, cut his spine.” Foster, 123 S. Ct. at 471. 
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deliberately caused delay; at any rate, Justice Thomas did not 
address delay attributable to the state. He did, however, 
address delay caused by time for the judicial review available 
to a death row inmate to run its course: Thomas found a 
“mockery of our system of justice . . . for a convicted murderer”45 
to claim delay “renders his sentence unconstitutional”46 when 
the postponement is a result of “his own interminable efforts of 
delay.”47 He noted, “I remain ‘unaware of any support in the 
American constitutional tradition or in this Court’s precedent 
for the proposition that a defendant can avail himself of a 
panoply of appellate and collateral procedures and then 
complain when his execution is delayed.’”48 There is little doubt 
that if the issue is to be resolved by Eighth Amendment 
precedent, Justice Thomas’s position prevails. Further, for 
those who like him see only the machinations of heinous 
criminals and abolitionists’ interminable ploys, the response to 
the suggestion that delay compromises the constitutional 
integrity of the sentence is moral outrage.49 
Justices Stevens and Breyer treat state-caused delay as 
building towards some number of years, which, if exceeded, 
ought to constitutionally prohibit execution. Justice Stevens 
points to the “staggering”50 error rate in capital trials, more 
than “30 percent of death verdicts overturned.”51 Justice Breyer 
takes issue with Justice Thomas for failing to distinguish 
between delay caused by “constitutionally defective death-
penalty procedures for which petitioner was not responsible”52 
and delay that is petitioner’s “fault.”53  
Neither “delay” nor “fault” attributable to the actions of 
either state actors or the defendant and his abolitionist lawyers 
adequately explains the dozen and more years it takes on 
average to deliver the condemned to the execution chamber in 
the United States. The complexity of the system and the 
demands for legal and judicial resources to carry cases through 
  
 45 Thompson, 129 S. Ct. at 1301 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) 
(quoting Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th. Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J., concurring)).  
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. (quoting Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999)). 
 49 Turner, 58 F.3d at 933 (Luttig, J., concurring) (quoted with approval by 
Thomas in Thompson and in Knight; has both criminals and abolitionists in his sights 
when he characterizes the defendant’s Lackey claim as “an affront to lawabiding citizens”).  
 50 Thompson, 129 S. Ct. at 1300.  
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 1303 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 53 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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the many appellate and postconviction stages are “responsible” 
for as much or more delay within the system taken as a whole 
than the machinations, misconduct, or errors of actors within 
the system.54 “Delay” is not the most apt term for the years 
between sentence and execution in many retentionist countries 
across the globe; with the benefit of contemporary standards of 
due process in death cases, retentionist countries cannot execute 
in “days or weeks”55 as our forbearers did, but many years or 
even decades after conviction and sentence. The most salient 
factor is unlikely to be delay attributed wholly to the defendant 
or the state but “delay” attributed to the complexity of, and 
resource limitations in, the death-penalty review system. Thus, 
the response of a judge to time consumed by the operation of the 
many tiered capital punishment regime is especially important 
in his or her analysis of the attribution problem. 
Justice Thomas attributes what could be termed 
“systemic delay” to prisoners in their efforts to delay or prevent 
execution. It would be a “mockery of justice” from the 
perspective of many retentionists to allow prisoners who have 
failed again and again to persuade courts of errors in their 
convictions or sentences to then claim immunity from 
execution.56 The logic of this position was captured by the Ninth 
Circuit in Judge O’Scannlain’s opinion in McKenzie v. Ray: “It 
would indeed be a mockery of justice if the delay incurred during 
the prosecution of claims that fail on the merits could itself 
accrue into a substantive claim to the very relief that had been 
sought and properly denied in the first place.”57 Justice La Forest 
made the same point powerfully in Kindler v. Canada: “It would 
be ironic if delay caused by the appellant’s taking advantage of 
the full and generous avenue of the appeals available to him 
should be viewed as a violation of fundamental justice.”58 
  
 54 The delays in the appellate system have been discussed by many authors. 
In his 2007 law review article, Judge Arthur Alarcon points to twenty institutionally 
created delays in the postconviction process, including delays in appellate and habeas 
counsel, delays in reporter transcription, and delays in the issuance of orders and 
certifications. Arthur L. Alarcon, Remedies for California’s Death Row Deadlock, 80 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 697 (2007).  
 55 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Other 
countries that retain the death penalty in the twenty-first century have elapsed times 
between sentence and execution comparable to those in the United States. See HOOD & 
HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 76, 173-74 (4th ed., Oxford 2008). 
 56 Knight, 528 U.S. at 993 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 57 McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1493, 1494 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 58 Knight, 528 U.S. at 998 (quoting Kindler v. Minister of Justice, [1991] 2 
S.C.R. 779, 779, 838 (Can.)). 
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However, what some see as reprehensible maneuvering 
others see as legitimate appeals to test conviction and sentence. 
Thus, Justice Breyer explains, “I do not believe that a 
petitioner’s decision to exercise his right to seek appellate review 
of his death sentence automatically waives a claim that the 
Eighth Amendment proscribes a delay of more than 30 years.”59  
Judges who regard contemporary enhanced due process 
standards of review of capital cases favorably are also inclined 
to regard the efforts of prisoners to avail themselves of these 
processes as manifestations of human nature, the will to live. 
In Soering v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human 
Rights opines that, “just as some lapse of time between 
sentence and execution is inevitable if appeal safeguards are to 
be provided to the condemned person, so it is equally part of 
human nature that the person will cling to life by exploiting 
those safeguards to the full.”60 Mde. Christine Chanet quotes this 
passage from Soering to support her dissent in Barrett and 
Sutcliffe v. Jamaica, in which she wrote, “Without being at all 
cynical, I consider that the author cannot be expected to hurry 
up in making appeals so that he can be executed more rapidly.”61 
Judges have observed that the very human desire to live 
renders a prolonged period in which a prisoner contests his 
sentence intolerably inhumane. Thus, Lord Scarman and Lord 
Brightman state in their Riley v. Attorney General of Jamaica 
dissent, “In truth, it is this ineradicable human desire which 
makes prolongation inhuman and degrading.”62 
Agreeing with the dissenters in Riley that it is human 
nature to fight to live, the Supreme Court of India repudiates 
the attribution question itself: 
We think that the cause of delay is immaterial when the sentence is 
death. Be the cause for the delay, the time necessary for appeal and 
consideration of reprieve or some other cause for which the accused 
himself may be responsible, it would not alter the dehumanizing 
character of the delay.63 
At first blush, the presentation of the attribution issue by 
Justice Stevens in Lackey suggests that a calculus might be 
employed by judges to determine whether, in a given case, the 
period of death row incarceration had exceeded the humane 
  
 59 Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1303 (2009). 
 60 Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).  
 61 Sutcliffe v. Jamaica, Communication No. 271/1988: Jamaica. 06/04/92.  
 62 Riley v. Attorney General of Jamaica, 1 A.C. 719 (1983). 
 63 Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1983 A.I.R. 361 (India). 
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limit. However, because—like the rest of us—judges tend either 
to attribute systemic delay to prisoners or decline to do so, there 
is no neutral attribution calculus for deciding Lackey petitions. 
In the bulk of cases, the delay attributable to egregious conduct 
on the part of the state or the prisoner will be dwarfed by that 
attributable to the operation of the contemporary death-penalty 
system. The attribution question devolves into a choice between 
two views of the condemned in the toils of the contemporary 
death penalty with its robust due process protections: the 
manipulator, who showed no pity in taking life and now parades 
his own suffering; or the condemned human being compelled by 
human nature to fight off annihilation year on year, in 
degradation of the law and his own humanity. The choice 
between these two views must fall to the voting strength of their 
adherents on constitutional courts or in legislative chambers. 
The same fault lines of judicial orientation on this issue are 
observable among U.S. jurists and those serving on foreign and 
international courts. While the U.S. Supreme Court is famously 
divided on the question of whether foreign and international 
judicial opinions should have even persuasive force in U.S. 
constitutional law,64 there are among these extranational sources 
opinions that resonate for both pro- and anti-Lackey justices, 
should they choose to pay heed to them.  
As for the elderly of death row—the particular subject of 
this article—within the terms of the attribution debate, their 
circumstances are much like those of other long-serving death 
row prisoners. Whatever the quantity or quality of their 
distress—like their younger peers—some will see them as 
manipulators and others as suffering intolerably inhumane 
treatment. There is, however, one salient difference in that at 
least some of the elderly may no longer be capable of 
strategizing. Thus, if charged with any delay beyond that point, 
it would result from the fact that they are constructively 
accountable for the wiles of their attorneys.  
  
 64 For example, in Roper v. Simmons, holding that murderers less than 
eighteen years of age when they killed are categorically exempt from capital 
punishment, Justice Kennedy, writing for himself and four other justices, relied 
extensively on the persuasive force of foreign and international opinions. 543 U.S. 551, 
567-68, 575-79 (2005). Justice Scalia vehemently contested this reliance in a dissent 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. Id. at 622-28 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). Justice O’Connor, who dissented on separate grounds, made no objection to 
the majority’s reliance on offshore law. Id. at 604 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
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V. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT TOLERATE DEATH 
ROW CONFINEMENT FOR ELDERLY PRISONERS—OR 
WON’T SOON 
Let us turn to the first question raised by the proposal 
for Lackey-for-the-Elderly: should the Eighth Amendment be 
understood to forbid death row incarceration of persons who 
reach the stipulated age or exhibit the infirmities and 
limitations of old age? 
The long confinement of prisoners on death row is a 
historical novelty. Traditionally, a prisoner was sent to death 
row in transit to eternity; death row stays were measured in 
days, weeks, and months, not decades.65 The prisoner who had 
no earthly future was to devote the death row interlude to 
making peace with his or her Maker as best he or she could. 
The justification for the bleak and barren nature of death row 
confinement66 is therefore linked to the liminal status of the 
condemned; their needs resembled those dying in freedom more 
than prisoners serving terms of years. The transitory nature of 
death row is no longer available as a justification for 
confinement in death row conditions for persons of any age: the 
transition justification for imposing these conditions cannot be 
sustained for twenty or thirty years. 
Contemporary prison administrators, however, like 
their predecessors in earlier periods, confront security 
challenges in managing death row populations: there are 
dangerous and desperate inmates among their charges. Death 
row conditions are justified as necessary to provide security 
dealing with dangerous prisoners with little to lose. The Eighth 
Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment ban has been 
consistently construed to afford prison officials wide discretion 
to achieve security, order, and discipline and to offer little relief 
  
 65 By the mid-twentieth century, prior to the reforms initiated in 1976 in 
Gregg v. Georgia, executions took place within months or (a very few) years after 
condemnation. Of the 227 executions carried out in the United States from 1956 to 
1959, almost half (107) occurred within one year of the sentence—thirty-eight within 
six months—and two-thirds occurred within two years of the sentence. Only fifteen 
executions occurred more than four years after the sentence. WILLIAM LUNDEN, BD. OF 
CONTROL OF STATE INSTS., THE DEATH PENALTY, AN ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT AND FACTORS RELATED TO MURDER 12 (1960). 
 66 Many jurisdictions prohibit death row inmates from contact visits. They are not 
given access to educational or occupational training. Death row inmates spend between 
twenty-one and twenty-three hours a day in their cells (most of which have solid doors that 
impede human contact), and many are not given access to any group recreation time. See 
Death Row Facts, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-
row (follow “Death Row Conditions” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 26, 2011). 
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to prisoners contesting prison conditions in light of these 
security considerations.67 To be sure, the Eighth Amendment 
does protect prisoners from inhumane treatment and 
conditions.68 However, in Wilson v. Seiter, the Court recognized 
that, while the Eighth Amendment forbad serious deprivation 
of prisoners’ basic human needs, it did so only when prison 
personnel acted with deliberate indifference to those needs.69 
Wilson presents a severely circumscribed notion of what 
constitutes the basic needs of prisoners: “food, warmth or 
exercise”70 and medical care.71 
 In addition to the narrowness of the conception of 
human need and the burden of establishing that prison 
personnel were at least reckless in contemplating the 
deprivation, the Court has rendered any prisoner’s efforts to 
redress prison conditions more difficult by adopting a balancing 
test under which security interests weigh heavily against even 
the most basic needs of prisoners. Thus Justice O’Connor, in 
Whitley v. Albers—a case whose facts turned on a prisoner’s 
being shot during the quelling of a prison disturbance—
weighed the interest of a prisoner in his physical security 
against the broader security interests for which prison officials 
are responsible: when security interests are challenged, the 
“deliberate indifference standard” must give way to a simple 
good-faith standard.72 The following year, in Turner v. Safley, 
Justice O’Connor summarized and reinforced the holdings of 
previous prison conditions cases: “when a prison regulation 
impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is 
valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests.”73 Security is a paramount interest of prison 
  
 67 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 312 (1986) (holding that infliction of pain in 
the course of prison security measures was an Eighth Amendment violation only if 
inflicted unnecessarily and wantonly, and finding that the shooting of a prisoner during a 
riot without prior verbal warning did not violate the Eighth Amendment); Rhodes v. 
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981) (holding that the Constitution does not mandate 
comfortable prisons, and that prisons which house inmates convicted of serious crimes 
cannot be free of discomfort); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 (1976) (holding that while 
deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of Eighth Amendment, inadvertent failure to provide 
adequate medical care to prisoner would not violate the Eighth Amendment). 
 68 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347 (holding that prison conditions that involved the 
wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, or deprived inmates of basic needs or the 
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities, violated the Eighth Amendment). 
 69 501 U.S. 294 (1991). 
 70 Id. at 304. 
 71 Id. at 300. 
 72 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). 
 73 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 
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administration, and administrators must be given wide 
discretion to determine how to provide it.74 
Once the fiction of transition gives way to the 
recognition of the reality of decades of confinement, the future 
of death-row-style confinement must depend uniquely on the 
security justification. Decades of idleness, isolation, and close 
confinement are unjustifiable as transitional for persons of any 
age. Potent as the security rationale may be in providing an 
Eighth Amendment blessing for death row conditions, security is 
an inapposite justification for death row confinement for the 
elderly. A prisoner who is dependent on the kindness of guards 
and fellow prisoners to comb his hair or walk to the shower does 
not require death row level security. The security rationale 
collapses when confronted with the realities of confining 
seventy- and eighty-year-old prisoners in death row conditions.  
The needs of the condemned elderly, as well as prison 
security needs, suggest that these elderly should be housed and 
cared for much as the growing legions of geriatric general 
prison population inmates created by the current sentencing 
regime75 are housed and cared for.76 Increasingly, the general 
population’s elderly are segregated for appropriate care for 
reasons of both efficiency and humanity.77 The trend towards 
providing more age appropriate conditions for elderly prisoners 
implicates the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishment with respect to the aged of death row. 
Should age appropriate care advance to the status of a norm of 
prison administration, neither the crabbed conception of basic 
human needs expressed in Rhodes and Wilson nor the 
deliberate indifference standard enshrined in those cases 
would be a barrier to the recognition that the Eighth 
  
 74 See also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1989) (supporting 
deference to security judgments of prison officials in recognition of institutional 
competence and also holding that federalism requires deference on the part of federal 
courts to state prison authorities). 
 75 The era of long mandatory sentences and the curtailment of parole has 
produced a large and growing geriatric general population in prison. See Joann Brown 
Morton, Implications for Corrections of an Aging Prison Population, 5 CORRECTIONS 
MGMT. Q. 78, 78-88 (2001); see also Ronald H. Aday, Golden Years Behind Bars: Special 
Programs and Facilities for Elderly Inmates, 58 FED. PROBATION 47, 9-11 (1994).  
 76 Bruce Gross, Elderly Offenders: Implications for Correctional Personnel, 
FORENSIC EXAMINER, Spring 2007, at 59-61 (describing prisons as designed for young 
offenders and as accelerating the deterioration in mental and physical fitness of the aged, 
and also their inability to walk fast enough, to see and hear well enough, to negotiate 
prison life, their susceptibility to being preyed upon by younger prisoners, their increased 
health care needs, and the challenges they present to prison administration).  
 77 Aday, supra note 27, at 144-67. 
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Amendment commands appropriate geriatric care for the 
elderly of death row as well as general population elderly. A 
brief review of the constitutional standards imposed on prison 
conditions will facilitate the argument. 
In Rhodes v. Chapman, the Court sought for the first 
time to establish the limits that the Eighth Amendment 
imposes on prison conditions that do not blatantly and 
unanswerably violate the commands of the Eighth 
Amendment. At issue in Rhodes was the practice of double 
celling.78 Whatever the merits of this practice, double celling 
does not rise to the level of atrocious maltreatment that had 
been held to violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of 
cruelty in earlier cases (e.g., whipping prisoners79 and 
intentionally or recklessly denying necessary medical care80). 
What then of a more general nature applicable to prison 
conditions does the Eighth Amendment teach? To answer this 
question, Justice Powell returned in Rhodes to Gregg v. 
Georgia’s analysis of the history and development of the 
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence81: Justice Powell 
relied upon the teaching of Gregg that the Eighth 
Amendment’s requirements are not static; rather, evolving 
standards of decency prohibit not only the “physically 
barbarous”82 but also “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain.”83 Unnecessary and wanton pain includes inflictions of 
pain “totally without penological justification.”84 Contrasting 
the practice of double celling with deprivation of medical 
attention and the systematically brutal, life imperiling 
conditions held to violate the Eighth Amendment in Hutto v. 
Finney, Justice Powell concluded that, unlike those conditions, 
double celling does not “deprive inmates of the minimal 
civilized measures of life’s necessities,” such as “essential food, 
medical care, or sanitation.”85 Justice Powell also sounds the 
theme of deference to prison officials in matters of security86 
  
 78 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 340 (1981). 
 79 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682 (1978).  
 80 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).  
 81 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1976). 
 82 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. 
 83 Id.  
 84 Id.  
 85 Id. at 347-48 
 86 Id. at 349 n.14 (“Moreover, a prison’s internal security is peculiarly a 
matter normally left to the discretion of prison administrators.”). 
1108 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:3 
and prison administration.87 Justice Powell thus equated the 
apparently more liberal Gregg standard, unnecessary and 
wanton infliction of pain without penological justification, with 
the more stringent standard, life’s minimal necessities. The 
bridge between these two apparently disparate standards is 
supplied by Justice Powell in Rhodes by deference to the 
institutional competence of prison administrators, who face 
resource limitations and are responsible for prison security. Such 
deference in effect means that Eighth Amendment review by 
courts must be limited to the most blatant and dire privations. 
Wilson v. Seiter presented an Eighth Amendment 
challenge to a congeries of prison conditions that were alleged 
to be systematically inhumane.88 Justice Scalia, writing for a 
majority of the Court, explained that even when alleging 
systematically inhumane conditions, the prisoner-petitioner 
must establish the deliberate indifference of prison officials.89 
Justice White offered a vigorous rebuttal in an opinion 
concurring in the judgment but protesting the imposition of the 
deliberate indifference standard in cases that do not involve 
“specific acts or omissions directed at individual prisoners.”90 
He argued that the standard was virtually impossible to meet 
in a case involving a challenge to systemically inhumane 
conditions, and one that could leave prisoners in 
constitutionally unacceptable conditions without recourse.91 He 
expressed concern that lack of resources would become an 
excuse for both constitutionally unacceptable conditions and 
the failure of courts to intervene.92 Justice White relied upon 
the Gregg standard that prisoners were not to be subjected to 
unnecessary pain without penological justification; Justice 
Scalia’s opinion for the Court was devoid of reference to that 
more demanding formulation, but rather relied solely on the 
basic needs, minimal necessities standard of Rhodes. 
Let us suppose the day arrives when age appropriate 
conditions of confinement for geriatric prisoners advances from 
  
 87 Id. at 351-52 n.16 (“For all of those reasons, courts are ill equipped to deal 
with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. Judicial 
recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism.”). 
 88 Prisoners were subjected to “overcrowding, excessive noise, insufficient 
locker storage space, inadequate heating and cooling, improper ventilation, unclean and 
inadequate restrooms, unsanitary dining facilities and food preparation, and housing 
with mentally and physically ill inmates.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296 (1991).  
 89 Id. at 303. 
 90 Id. at 309. 
 91 Id. at 310. 
 92 Id. at 311. 
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a trend to a norm of prison management: Rhodes and Wilson 
will not stand in the way of recognizing that the Eighth 
Amendment requires relief from death row confinement and 
even substantial parity of treatment with the general 
population elderly, provided that security concerns are 
recognized to recede for an aged population. The “deliberate 
indifference” standard of Rhodes and Wilson would not protect 
prison officials who failed to conform to established norms for 
carceral care of elderly inmates. Prison administrators cannot 
claim ignorance of the standards and norms of their profession. 
The Eighth Amendment will command laggards to comply. 
Further, the reasons for the current trend toward providing 
geriatric care in prisons suggests that the gap between the 
minimalist basic needs standard of Justice Scalia in Wilson and 
that of avoidance of unnecessary pain in the older cases would 
not doom the claim under the more stringent standard. If, as 
some contemporary experts and practitioners maintain, age 
appropriate care is in fact more efficient, then resource scarcity 
does not provide a practical barrier to a conception of basic needs 
at least robust enough to avoid physical suffering. Collecting the 
elderly in facilities designed to meet the needs of the aged 
prisoner could prove both more humane and more efficient. 
Appropriate prison geriatric care would then find a home in the 
Eighth Amendment and the distinction between death row and 
general population in this regard would prove untenable.  
The issue before the U.S. Supreme Court in the Lackey 
cases has not been long death row confinement but execution of 
prisoners long on death row. Let us now examine the case for 
an Eighth Amendment bar to the execution of the long 
incarcerated elderly.  
VI. DOES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT TOLERATE THE 
EXECUTION OF THE CONDEMNED LONG-SERVING 
ELDERLY?  
There are two daunting hurdles confronting proponents 
of any type of Lackey claim. One hurdle is pragmatic, in that its 
recognition produces unacceptable consequences. For if the 
general Lackey claim were recognized, it could bring us 
perilously close to total abolition.  
The second hurdle is the apparent inability of a Lackey 
claim to satisfy the demands of the methodology the Supreme 
Court employs in determining whether execution constitutes 
cruel and usual treatment. This is the doctrinal, or merits, 
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problem facing proponents of the proposition that the Eighth 
Amendment should recognize a Lackey claim. The difficulty in 
sum is that the Court requires evidence that contemporary 
standards of decency no longer tolerate execution. The Court’s 
method has relied heavily on evidence that legislation in the 
states manifests the development of a consensus against the 
practice of executing the class in question. Lackey claims 
therefore face an apparently insuperable hurdle: no American 
legislation has endorsed the claim. 
Whether or not the general Lackey claim must fall 
before these barriers, I will argue that Lackey-for-the-Elderly 
may have a less arduous course. Let us first examine the 
pragmatics and then the doctrinal Eighth Amendment support 
for barring the execution of the long-serving elderly. 
A. Pragmatics 
1. Lackey-for-the-Elderly Is Consonant with the Supreme 
Court’s History of Limited, Piecemeal Abolition 
Long imprisonment on death row is the norm—not the 
exception—for those eventually executed. The Supreme Court 
has gradually narrowed the reach of capital punishment but 
these reforms do not imply a willingness to trench so deeply as 
to challenge the retention of capital punishment as would the 
institution of a Lackey regime. A further pragmatic 
consideration is the fear that any Lackey-like restrictions on 
execution will spur a rush to execution.93 
Although the general Lackey claim may be a bridge too 
far for the Supreme Court at this juncture, Lackey-for-the-
Elderly may be within the bounds of the achievable. Its 
modesty comports with the gradual, piecemeal reformist 
trajectory of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment capital 
jurisprudence since the 1976 Gregg decision that inaugurated 
the contemporary capital punishment regime. For while the 
numbers of the aged on death row are increasing, they will 
remain a relatively small segment of the long-serving 
condemned.94 Their numbers will become large enough for the 
  
 93 Justice Thomas observes, “The [Lackey] claim might . . . provide reviewing 
courts a perverse incentive to give short shrift to a capital defendant’s legitimate 
claims so as to avoid violating the Eighth Amendment right . . . .” Knight v. Florida, 
528 U.S. 990, 992 (1999). 
 94 At year end 2009, 2.6 percent of death row was sixty-five or older and 8.2 
percent was sixty or older. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2009, supra note 18, at 9 tbl.5.  
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issue of their execution to be salient in the experience of courts 
and prisons, but not so large that sparing them will strike a 
mortal or near mortal blow to capital punishment. 
In the 1970s the United States Supreme Court 
considered total abolition of the death penalty but opted 
instead for permitting retention provided novel constitutional 
strictures were respected. In lieu of total abolition, the Court 
embarked upon reform. It required enhanced or “super due 
process”95 for death cases, and constricted the reach of capital 
punishment.96 The Court gradually augmented a list of crimes 
and criminals that were ineligible for the capital sanction. 
Jurisdictions wishing to retain capital punishment were 
required to devise statutes that would reserve capital 
punishment for the worst of the worst murders and murderers. 
Only homicides—and among them only the most aggravated 
murders—remain eligible for capital punishment.97 Nor are 
persons who “did not commit and had no intention of 
committing” homicides98 any longer eligible for capital 
punishment, eliminating capital liability for persons who take 
part in a felony where murder was committed by an 
accomplice. Recently the mentally retarded99 and persons less 
than eighteen when they killed100 were categorically exempted. 
Previously those less than sixteen years of age when they killed 
had been exempted.101 All the while, abolitionists and 
retentionists vied for political support and for supremacy in the 
  
 95 Margaret Jane Radin coined this apt phrase in her article, Cruel 
Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1143 (1980). 
 96 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the death penalty for the rape of a child); Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that it is unconstitutional to execute any offender who is under 
eighteen at the time the crime was committed); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311, 321 
(2002) (holding that executions of mentally retarded criminals are “cruel and unusual 
punishments” prohibited by Eighth Amendment); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 
(1988) (holding that defendants who are less than sixteen at the time of their crime 
cannot be executed); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding that it is a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment to execute the insane); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 
782 (1982) (holding that the death penalty for those who neither killed nor intended to 
kill in the course of a felony constitutes cruel and unusual punishment); Coker v. Georgia, 
433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that the imposition of the death penalty for rape of an adult 
woman violates the Eighth Amendment).  
 97 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801.  
 98 Id.  
 99 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304. 
 100 Roper, 543 U.S. at 551. 
 101 Thompson, 487 U.S. 815. 
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courts.102 The product of these vectors has been partial abolition 
by attrition. An unintended consequence of the enhanced due 
process regime and the contestation of capital punishment is 
that the condemned await final resolution of their cases for 
historically unprecedented periods. This long gestation period 
gives rise to the Lackey issue—whether it is cruel and unusual 
punishment to convert a sentence of death into a sentence of 
decades on death row followed by execution.  
Relief for the elderly condemned would be another 
exclusion of a limited and discrete class. Relief for the entire 
class of the long-serving condemned would be a far more 
consequential abolitionist step. Indeed, because our capital 
punishment regime takes so long to produce executions, a 
Lackey rule would be close to a mortal blow to capital 
punishment rather than one more in a series of modest 
exclusions. The trouble with the Lackey claim is that it breaks 
with the established practice of the Supreme Court’s paring 
back and chipping away at capital punishment and instead 
trenches deeply. By the end of 2009, there were well over six 
hundred prisoners who had been on death row for twenty years 
or longer, comprising very nearly 20 percent of the total death 
row population.103 More than two hundred had been on death 
row for twenty-five years or longer.104 Almost 80 percent of long-
serving inmates were admitted to death row in their twenties 
and thirties, with the balance divided almost equally between 
nineteen-year-olds and persons forty and older.105 By 
comparison, the numbers of death row elderly are relatively 
modest. There were approximately eighty individuals sixty-five 
or older on death row at the end of 2009.106 A Lackey-for-the 
Elderly rule would be consonant with the scope and pace of 
gradual retrenchment that has thus far found acceptance in 
the Supreme Court. Further, Lackey-for-the-Elderly mimics the 
recent exclusion of those under eighteen years of age at the 
time they committed a capital crime and the mentally 
  
 102 See, e.g., AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS, ch. 6 (Princeton 2001); 
Austin Sarat, Capital Punishment as a Fact of Legal, Political and Cultural Life, in 
THE KILLING STATE (Austin Sarat, ed., Oxford 1999). 
 103 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2009, supra note 18, at 19 tbl.18.  
 104 Id. 
 105 Only 11.1 percent of death row prisoners were forty or older when arrested; 
10.5 were nineteen or younger. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2008, supra note 24, at 10 tbl.7. 
 106 On December 31, 2009, 2.6 percent of 3173 total prisoners on death row 
were over the age of sixty-five. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2009, supra note 18, at 9 tbl.5.  
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retarded107 in that there is an essentially objective, even 
arithmetic, definition available for demarcating the class of the 
excluded, relieving concerns about manipulation and 
undeserving claims. Lackey-for-the-Elderly is therefore a more 
practical goal: it would, if embraced by the Supreme Court, be 
consistent with its inclinations to date and offer relief to a 
cohort whose continued life under the shadow of the gallows is 
acutely misaligned with Eighth Amendment values.  
2. Would a Lackey-for-the-Elderly Regime Produce a 
Rush to Execution? 
Would rules sparing the elderly—or, for that matter, all 
the long-incarcerated condemned—lead to accelerated rates of 
executions for either of these classes of prisoners? Would a 
Lackey regime result in “speed rather than accuracy”108 in 
capital litigation, a consequence that would dismay defenders 
of due process whether or not they are of abolitionist 
sympathies?109 Could the adoption of such protection reverse the 
trend of secular decline in executions or propel more elderly 
and long-serving prisoners into the ranks of those actually 
executed? I will argue that these fears are not well founded. 
Most execution-prone states share with less active 
death-penalty states populations of long-serving and elderly 
prisoners. Among the ten most execution-prone states, only 
Virginia lacks prisoners who have been on death row at least 
twenty-five years.110 Texas has nineteen.111 Florida is the leader 
in this class with more than sixty.112 The most execution-prone 
states, with the exception of Virginia, do not outperform the 
less execution-prone death-penalty states dramatically in the 
  
 107 To qualify for the protection of Atkins, an offender must have an IQ no 
higher than seventy to seventy-five. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 309 n.5 (2002). 
 108 McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 109 Judge Kozinski expresses the concern about the consequences of a Lackey 
regime,  
By and large, the delay in carrying out death sentences has been of benefit to 
death row inmates, allowing them to extend their lives, obtain commutation 
or reversal of their sentences or, in rare cases, secure complete exoneration. 
Sustaining a [Lackey] claim . . . would, we fear, wreak havoc with the orderly 
administration of the death penalty in this country by placing a substantial 
premium on speed rather than accuracy. 
Id. at 1467. 
 110 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2009, supra note 18, at 19 tbl.18.  
 111 Id.  
 112 Id.  
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average number of years prisoners have been on death row. 
The national average time in 2009 was 12.7 years.113 For 
California, a state that rarely executes, the average was 14.2,114 
but it was 13.9 for Florida.115 Georgia did not do much better at 
13.3.116 Texas, the leader in executions performed, achieved 
10.8.117 Other than Virginia’s stellar 5.4 years,118 the best records 
achieved by the ten most execution-prone states were in South 
Carolina and Oklahoma, which managed to get below 10 years, 
at 9 and 8.9 respectively.119  
I base my skepticism on what I consider to be the dim 
prospects for efficiency reforms of the death-penalty system. 
The number of years to resolve cases has increased over a 
decade in which there has been a pronounced secular decline in 
the number of executions.120 The ratio, as it were, of systemic 
effort per resulting execution has steadily increased. The two 
most plausible avenues of reform are money to move cases 
more quickly and competently through the system and the 
streamlining of the appellate and postconviction process.121 To 
date, such measures have either not made a difference in 
reversing the secular trend or have failed to garner sufficient 
support to be introduced. It is vanishingly unlikely that the 
well-documented shortage of qualified trial and appellate 
counsel will be addressed any time soon by cash-strapped 
states that did not take this step even when their resources 
were greater. The prospects for streamlining the process are no 
better. The passage of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996,122 for example, which restricts habeas relief 
for death row prisoners, has not reversed the trends to longer 
delays and fewer executions. To the frustration of some 
retentionists, the underlying cause of the multitiered and time-
consuming legal processes is the so-called super due process for 
  
 113 Id.  
 114 Id.  
 115 Id.  
 116 Id.  
 117 Id.  
 118 Id.  
 119 Id.  
 120 Despite a steep drop in both the number of executions and the number of 
admissions to death row over the decade, time under sentence of death for those 
executed increased from eleven years and eleven months in 1999 to fourteen years and 
one month in 2009. See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2009, supra note 18; see also CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 1999, supra note 17. 
 121 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently proposed both as solutions 
to California’s backlog of death row cases. Alarcon, supra note 54, at 698.  
 122 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. 
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death required by the Supreme Court coupled with the 
matching zeal of pro- and anti-death-penalty litigators. To date, 
the political will to execute has not been sufficient to result in 
spending public money and court resources on death cases to 
reverse the trend toward more time to produce fewer executions. 
It is doubtful that the recognition that a Clarence Ray Allen is 
too old to execute would galvanize more public and retentionist 
reaction than, for example, the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
to prohibit execution of child rapists123 or the increasingly more 
publicized fact that only a small fraction of those condemned 
since 1976 have actually been executed. 
Let us look at the reaction to the introduction of a 
Lackey-like regime in the Caribbean nation of Jamaica for 
possible lessons about the impact of such a regime in the 
United States. The Anglophone Caribbean nations retain 
capital punishment; the death penalty enjoys strong public and 
political support as a consequence of the high rates of murder 
and other violent crime these countries suffer.124 Until recently 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has been the high 
court for all former British dependencies in the Caribbean, a 
relationship that is in the early stages of being replaced by a 
regional court, the Caribbean Court of Justice. In 1993, the 
Judicial Committee ruled in Pratt and Morgan v. The Attorney 
General of Jamaica that, under the Jamaican Constitution, it 
would constitute inhuman and degrading punishment to 
execute a person imprisoned under sentence of death for more 
than five years.125 The decision resulted in the commutation of 
approximately two hundred death sentences in the region.126 
The decision stimulated anti-imperialist and nationalist 
resistance and increased momentum for the creation of a 
regional court to displace the Privy Council. There were 
predictions that the decision would inspire “hanging courts.”127 
There have been no executions in Jamaica since Pratt and 
  
 123 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 447, opinion modified on denial of 
reh’g, 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008).  
 124 See ROGER G. HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY: A 
WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 106 (4th ed., Oxford 2008). 
 125 Pratt & Morgan v. Jamaica, 3 SLR 995, 2 AC 1, 4 All ER 769 (Privy 
Council 1993) (en banc).  
 126 Andrew Novak, The Decline of the Mandatory Death Penalty in Common 
Law Africa: Constitutional Challenges and Comparative Jurisprudence in Malawi and 
Uganda, 11 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 19, 27 (2009).  
 127 Leonard Birdsong, The Formation of the Caribbean Court of Justice: The 
Sunset of British Colonial Rule in the English Speaking Caribbean, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 197, 203-04 (2005). 
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Morgan.128 The Pratt and Morgan decision has been a much 
criticized decision by retentionists, but has been criticized by 
abolitionist critics as well who fear “hanging courts.”  
Would prisoners who might otherwise be left to languish 
in obscure corners of death row be victims of Lackey-for-the-
Elderly? The sluggishness of the death-penalty system in the 
United States, Jamaica, and other countries where stringent 
due process standards are respected suggests that fears of a 
rush to the gallows are misplaced. My argument is necessarily 
speculative, as there is no record to consult for the 
counterfactual Lackey scenario in the United States. My 
argument relies on both the natural experiment produced by 
Pratt and Morgan in Jamaica and the history of protracted 
multitiered litigation in death cases necessary to satisfy 
contemporary due process and human rights standards. 
B. On the Merits: The Case that the Eighth Amendment 
Bars Execution of the Long-Serving Elderly 
The case for Lackey-for-the-Elderly is in effect a 
specialized and augmented version of the Lackey claim. 
Support for the Elderly version therefore rests in part on the 
strength of the case for the general Lackey claim. Likewise, 
understanding the additional merits of the Elderly claim 
requires review of the case for the general Lackey claim. 
1. In Recent Cases, the Supreme Court’s Eighth 
Amendment Methodology Has Become More 
Favorable to the Success of Lackey Claims 
At first blush, the chances for success of the Lackey 
claim look bleak. Justice Thomas pointed out that he was 
“unaware of any support [for it] in the American constitutional 
tradition or in this Court’s precedent”129 and equally that no 
state or federal court has recognized a Lackey claim since the 
first denial of certiorari in Lackey v. Texas.130 His point must be 
conceded, for it was accurate when made in 1999 and remains 
true at this writing. However, a methodological shift in recent 
Supreme Court cases considering whether the Eighth 
  
 128 HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 124, at 106. 
 129 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
denial of certiorari for a Lackey claim). 
 130 Id. at 461.  
2012] A MODEST PROPOSAL 1117 
Amendment permits execution for particular classes of 
offenders suggests that Lackey claims may not be as outside 
the pale as its critics would prefer. 
The Eighth Amendment standard by which the 
constitutionality of a form of punishment is to be judged was 
established in Trop v. Dulles: whether the punishment 
comports with “evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”131 The Supreme Court has 
barred the execution of several classes of persons who were 
traditionally subject to capital punishment because the 
punishment for them would be cruel and unusual in light of 
contemporary standards. Invoking the Eighth Amendment’s 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the Court has 
excluded the mentally retarded,132 and youthful murderers,133 
and those who have been convicted because, during the course 
of committing a felony, an accomplice took life.134 
In two of the recent cases, Atkins v. Virginia135 and Roper 
v. Simmons,136 the Court relaxed the requirements for 
exclusion, to the dismay of the dissenting justices. The Court 
relied more heavily than in earlier cases on its “own judgment” 
or “independent judgment” and less on objective indicia of an 
evolution in public values. Although also continuing to rely on 
“objective” indicia of a national consensus to be found in 
legislative enactments and the practice of the states, the 
Court’s majorities were satisfied with less robust “objective” 
evidence of the development of a national consensus.137 The 
Court’s reliance on its “own judgment,” as will be seen, is 
deeply rooted in its capital Eighth Amendment precedents, and 
bodes well for the future reception of Lackey claims. 
Writing for the Court in Roper, Justice Kennedy 
reviewed the method by which a determination is to be made as 
to whether offenders who kill before their eighteenth birthday 
  
 131 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). 
 132 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).  
 133 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), abrogating Stanford v. Kentucky, 
492 U.S. 361 (1989).  
 134 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982); see also Tison v. Arizona, 481 
U.S. 137 (1987) (refining the Enmund standard and holding that reckless indifference 
is sufficient to satisfy intent if the defendant is a major participant in a felony that 
results in murder).  
 135 Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. 
 136 Roper, 543 U.S. 551. 
 137 In the most recent capital exclusion case, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 
407 (2008), discussed infra at note 165, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion is yet more 
assertive of reliance on normative judgment at the expense of the weight accorded 
legislative enactments.  
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should be categorically exempt from capital punishment. The 
three sources of support recognized in previous cases are 
“legislative enactments,”138 “state practice,”139 and “our own 
judgment.”140 Additionally, the Court looks to foreign and 
international law as instructive but not controlling.141 In the 
earlier cases, the Court accorded preeminence to statutes.142 In 
Coker v. Georgia, for example, the Court relied on the finding 
that Georgia was the only jurisdiction whose law authorized 
capital punishment for the rape of an adult woman as support 
for a constitutional bar against capital punishment for rapists 
of adult women.143 The Court again emphasized the importance 
of statutes as evidence of the crystallization of consensus in 
Enmund v. Florida.144 There the record was less “compelling”145 
but nonetheless strong: a large majority of states no longer 
permitted the execution of those who neither contemplated nor 
intended killing in the course of a felony, such as robbery 
during which an accomplice killed.146 But when the Court 
barred execution of the mentally retarded in Atkins, only 
eighteen of the then thirty-eight death-penalty states, and the 
federal jurisdiction, exempted the mentally retarded by 
statute.147 In Roper in 2005, the Court conceded that the objective 
indicia embodied in statutes was weaker than in the earlier 
cases in both Atkins and in the instant case exempting persons 
who were not yet eighteen when they committed murder.148 
Indeed, a bare majority of the death-penalty states had no 
statutory prohibition against the execution of the mentally 
retarded or murderers who were seventeen years of age but not 
yet eighteen when they killed.149 The majority opinions in the two 
cases reasoned that recent additions to the ranks of prohibiting 
states, prohibitory statutes of more long standing, and the 
addition of the bloc of states that had abolished capital 
punishment entirely established that we had arrived at a 
  
 138 Roper, 543 U.S. at 563.  
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 575-78. 
 142 Legislation is the “clearest and most reliable objective evidence of 
contemporary values.” Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abrogated by 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  
 143 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 595-96 (1976). 
 144 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
 145 Id. at 793. 
 146 Id. at 792. 
 147 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313.  
 148 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 597-98 (2005). 
 149 Id. at 564. 
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national legislative consensus against the execution of the 
mentally retarded and youthful murderers.150 Inevitably, to 
compensate for the comparative weakness of the “objective” case 
relative to its strength in previous cases establishing categorical 
exclusions, the arguments for the Court’s independent judgment 
must bear greater weight in the two recent cases.  
The dissenters’ verdict is that the Atkins and Roper 
majorities have substituted their own subjective moral 
judgments for the objective social consensus demanded by Trop 
v. Dulles and the Court’s previous Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence of capital exemption. Justice Scalia’s dissents in 
both cases are scathing, for he found that the Court has 
abandoned reliance on social consensus as the touchstone of 
evolving Eighth Amendment values in favor of “the subjective 
views of individual Justices.”151 In his Atkins dissent, Justice 
Scalia declared, “Seldom has an opinion of this Court rested so 
obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its Members.”152 
In Roper, he again dissented, “Because I do not believe that the 
meaning of our Eighth Amendment . . . should be determined by 
the subjective views of five Members of this Court . . . .”153  
Plausible as this criticism may appear initially, it is 
misleading to characterize the majorities’ reliance on their 
independent judgment as either merely “subjective” or as a 
jurisprudential departure. The Court in Atkins and Roper 
reverts to a well-established method of normative analysis 
employed in Eighth Amendment cases, with roots that go back 
at least as far as the foundation of the contemporary capital 
regime (i.e., to Gregg v. Georgia). Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice Scalia, dissenters in Atkins and Roper, rejected this 
approach. Their view prevailed temporarily in Stanford v. 
Kentucky.154 In that case the Supreme Court, in an opinion 
authored by Justice Scalia, repudiated the previously 
established reliance on the independent judgments of the 
justices as an ingredient in determinations of contemporary 
standards of decency.155 But in Atkins, this holding of Stanford 
  
 150 Id. at 564-68. 
 151 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 341 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 
433 U.S. 584, 592 (1976)). 
 152 Id. at 338. 
 153 Roper, 543 U.S. at 608.  
 154 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding that the imposition of 
capital punishment on an individual for a crime committed at sixteen or seventeen years 
of age did not violate evolving standards of decency and thus did not constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment), abrogated by Roper, 543 U.S. 551. 
 155 Id. at 378-80. 
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proved to be a spur, a single shoot without progeny. The Court 
in Atkins and Roper reverted to reliance on the independent 
judgment of the justices as relevant to its determination of the 
Eighth Amendment propriety of capital punishment. Their 
judgment was inevitably normative, but this does not entail 
that it was merely subjective. The Atkins and Roper majority 
opinions apply normative standards regularly employed in the 
Court’s capital Eighth Amendment precedents. 
In Coker v. Georgia, the first of the categorical exclusion 
cases, the Court held that “the Constitution contemplates that 
in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the 
question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the 
Eighth Amendment.”156 The Court arrived at that judgment by 
inquiring into whether capital punishment serves the 
constitutionally required goals of punishment: 
Under Gregg, a punishment is “excessive” and unconstitutional if it 
(1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of 
punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and 
needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of 
proportion to the severity of the crime. A punishment might fail the 
test on either ground.157 
The goals of punishments, as reiterated in all the 
Supreme Court cases mandating capital exclusion, are 
deterrence and retribution: “The death penalty is said to serve 
two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of 
capital crimes by prospective offenders.”158 
Since Coker, and relying on Gregg,159 the Court has held 
that unless capital punishment advances the penal goals of 
  
 156 Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (quoted in Atkins, 536 U.S. at 341 and Roper, 543 
U.S. at 590). 
 157 Id. at 592 (White, J.). The sentence preceding that quoted in the text above 
details the precedents for this holding:  
In sustaining the imposition of the death penalty in Gregg, however, the 
Court firmly embraced the holdings and dicta from prior cases, Furman v. 
Georgia, [408 U.S. 238]; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), to 
the effect that the Eighth Amendment bars not only those punishments that are 
“barbaric” but also those that are “excessive” in relation to the crime committed.  
Id. at 591-92. 
 158 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also 
Coker, 433 U.S. at 592; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 782-83 (1982); Atkins, 536 
U.S. at 319; Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995); Roper, 543 U.S. at 552.  
 159 And indeed on Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (holding 
that the imposition of the death penalty on offenders convicted of rape would violate 
the Eighth Amendment).  
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retribution or deterrence, it is barred by the Eighth Amendment. 
In debates about the Lackey issue, retribution is to the fore and 
deterrence recedes in that the plausibility of additional 
deterrent value in execution after decades of incarceration in the 
shadow of the gallows is difficult to defend.160 The Court’s Lackey 
debates therefore turn on whether decades-plus-death is 
excessive retribution offensive to the Eighth Amendment. In 
Atkins and Roper, the Court held that in its independent 
judgment, the deficiencies in judgment and self-control 
attributable to mental disability and immaturity rendered the 
retarded and youthful murderers less culpable than normal and 
mature murderers.161 Thus, these classes were not among the 
most culpable murderers for whom capital punishment was 
retributively justified, a judgment reflected in a large and 
growing number of statutory prohibitions.162 
Critics of the Lackey claim will of course hasten to note 
that the Lackey claim has not been endorsed in a single American 
statute or adopted by any American court. How then could the 
Lackey claim prevail within the framework established in the 
capital exclusion cases? Justices Stevens and Breyer adumbrated 
the available Eighth Amendment arguments in their demurrals 
from the denial of certiorari in the Lackey cases. There are two 
crucial lines of argument necessary to support Lackey claims. One 
is of course the standard Eighth Amendment argument that 
decades-plus-death is retributively excessive punishment. The 
second breaks new Eighth Amendment ground. Previously, cases 
acknowledging capital exclusion have tested whether 
traditionally accepted practices had outlived their social mandate. 
The Lackey claim, by contrast, questions whether an emergent 
practice is permitted by the Eighth Amendment.  
The Lackey claim is directed against a novel form of cruel 
punishment alien to tradition—persons serving decades on death 
row, perhaps half a lifetime, perhaps into old age. It is directed 
against a cruel innovation rather than a cruel relic. The model of 
social history implicit in Trop v. Dulles is progressive. It deserves 
  
 160 In Lackey v. Texas Justice Stevens writes, “additional deterrent effect from 
an actual execution now, on the one hand, as compared to 17 years on death row 
followed by the prisoner’s continued incarceration for life, on the other, seems 
minimal.” 514 U.S. at 1046. This proposition resounds through subsequent Lackey 
cases. In Knight v. Florida, Justice Thomas apparently concedes as much in noting 
that Justice Breyer’s criticism of execution after long delay for lack of additional 
deterrent effect would be remedied by reverting to something like our earlier and 
sprightlier system. 528 U.S. 990, 990 n.1 (1999). 
 161 Roper, 534 U.S. at 552.  
 162 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; Roper, 543 U.S. at 571. 
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the old-fashioned designation “whiggish” in that it assumes that 
society continually improves, becomes ever more humane. It can 
be argued, therefore, that the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence of capital exclusion is restricted by Trop v. Dulles to 
delivering the coup de grace to decaying practices. The alternative 
is to recognize the limitations of the Trop v. Dulles model when 
confronted by historically novel forms of cruelty. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court in Atkins, and more starkly in Roper, without 
fully acknowledging the fact, relied less on a history of American 
progress and more on normative judgment to ban practices 
permitted by the majority of death-penalty states. In Roper 
especially, the majority also turned to the very strong support for 
barring the execution of persons under eighteen in international 
and foreign law.163 Indeed, whether or not one shares the 
dissenting justices’ pejorative view of the majority opinions in 
Atkins and Roper, those justices are correct that the majority 
opinions rely on normative judgments and foreign and 
international law to a far greater extent than previous Eighth 
Amendment capital exclusion cases. The Lackey claim, like the 
bar on the execution of youthful offenders, enjoys robust support 
in international and foreign law.  
In the most recent of the capital exclusion cases, Kennedy 
v. Louisiana, the Court delivered yet another blow to the vaunted 
importance of state legislative consensus in its Eighth 
Amendment capital exclusion methodology.164 Justice Kennedy 
considered an objection to the Court’s holding that a national 
consensus had developed against the execution of rapists of 
children, based on the small number of states that authorized 
their execution and the fact that no child rapist had been 
executed by any state in forty years.165 The objection was that the 
Court was “blocking” the development of a national consensus 
  
 163 Thus, Justice Kennedy writes, 
The overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death 
penalty is not controlling here, but provides respected and significant 
confirmation for the Court’s determination that the penalty is 
disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 . . . . The United States 
is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the 
juvenile penalty. It does not lessen fidelity to the Constitution or pride in its 
origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental 
rights by other nations and peoples underscores the centrality of those same 
rights within our own heritage of freedom. 
Roper, 543 U.S. at 554.  
 164 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
 165 Id. at 409.  
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rather than relying on such a consensus.166 Louisiana argued that 
the Coker decision had been read broadly to ban execution for 
nonlethal child rape rather than specifically and only the rape of 
an adult woman. Kennedy v. Louisiana clarified any ambiguity 
about Coker. Coker prohibited execution for the rape of an adult 
woman, not nonlethal child rape.167 Thus, the argument goes, 
legislatures in the states did not appreciate that they were free to 
permit or forbid execution for child rapists. The question of 
whether a national consensus existed against the practice was 
therefore untested in the states.168 The Court should wait upon the 
day when legislatures have affirmatively banned execution for 
child rapists to declare a national consensus rather than act in 
the face of legislative inaction.169 To ban execution of child rapists 
under the Eighth Amendment would stifle the development of a 
consensus. To act in the absence of legislative bans would violate 
the Court’s methodological commitment to look to state 
legislatures for evidence of national consensus.  
Justice Kennedy’s rejoinder to this criticism would seem to 
diminish further the relative weight of the “objective” component 
in Eighth Amendment capital exclusion methodology. He 
associated “evolving standards of decency” with the Court’s duty 
to restrain the use of capital punishment to insure its use only for 
crimes that are judged to be among the worst, apparently at the 
expense of the importance of the record of legislative enactments. 
He wrote, 
These concerns overlook the meaning and full substance of the 
established proposition that the Eighth Amendment is defined by 
“the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.” Confirmed by repeated, consistent rulings of this 
Court, this principle requires that use of the death penalty be 
restrained. The rule of evolving standards of decency with specific 
marks on the way to full progress and mature judgment means that 
  
 166 See id. at 446 (“Our determination that there is a consensus against the 
death penalty for child rape raises the question whether the Court’s own institutional 
position and its holding will have the effect of blocking further or later consensus in 
favor of the penalty from developing. The Court, it will be argued, by the act of 
addressing the constitutionality of the death penalty, intrudes upon the consensus-
making process. By imposing a negative restraint, the argument runs, the Court makes 
it more difficult for consensus to change or emerge. The Court, according to the 
criticism, itself becomes enmeshed in the process, part judge and part the maker of 
that which it judges.”). 
 167 Id. at 426-27, 429. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. at 446. 
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resort to the penalty must be reserved for the worst of crimes and 
limited in its instances of application.170 
In sum, in its three most recent capital exclusion cases, 
the Supreme Court has tempered its reliance on the tally of 
state enactments and reasserted its reliance on its own 
normative judgment. Normative analysis of whether capital 
punishment for a crime or a class of offenders is excessive 
punishment has been a factor in the Court’s capital 
jurisprudence since Gregg v. Georgia. In the recent cases, 
Atkins and Roper—and in a more limited and subtle way 
Kennedy v. Louisiana—the Court has recalibrated the 
importance of normative analysis relative to the so-called 
“objective indicia” of evolution of standards. The Supreme 
Court could travel further down the road already taken and 
recognize the Lackey claim—or the more modest Lackey-for-
the-Elderly claim.  
2. Decades-Plus-Death Is Excessive Punishment 
Forbidden by the Eighth Amendment 
Justices Stevens and Breyer consider at least three 
arguments in favor of the general Lackey claim in their dissents 
from denial of certiorari in Lackey cases. The touchstone 
argument is that decades-plus-death is retributively excessive 
punishment and therefore lacks an Eighth Amendment 
justification. The justices also argue that decades-plus-death is 
sanctioned neither by our legal tradition nor by considered or 
express political recognition. Additionally, Stevens and Breyer 
find support for Lackey in the jurisprudence of foreign 
constitutional courts and international law.171 
a. Decades-Plus-Death Is Retributively Excessive 
Punishment 
The capital exclusion cases hark back to Gregg v. 
Georgia for the framework for understanding retributive 
  
 170 Id. at 446-47 (citations omitted). 
 171 From the retirement of Justice Stevens in 2010 to the present writing, no 
other justice has publicly endorsed granting certiorari to a Lackey claim. Should the 
day arrive when certiorari is granted, a stock of arguments for granting the petition is 
in hand in the dissents from denial of certiorari written by Justices Stevens and 
Breyer. Indeed, Justice Stevens’s memorandum to the denial of certiorari in Lackey v. 
Texas in 1995 supplies jurisprudential seed sufficient to the task. Lackey v. Texas, 514 
U.S. 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., mem. respecting denial of cert.).  
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justification and retributive excess. Justice White wrote in 
Coker v. Georgia, 
Under Gregg, a punishment is “excessive” and unconstitutional if it 
(1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of 
punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and 
needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of 
proportion to the severity of the crime. A punishment might fail the 
test on either ground.172 
“Gregg instructs,” Justice Kennedy reiterated in 
Kennedy v. Louisiana, that “the two distinct purposes served by 
the death penalty” are “retribution and deterrence of capital 
crimes.”173 Justices Stevens and Breyer in their Lackey opinions 
explored arguments for the thesis that this novel imposition of 
decades-plus-death is not justified by a gain in deterrence174 and 
exceeds the limits of justified retribution. Punishment that is 
justified neither as deterrence nor as an appropriate level or 
type of retribution is “gratuitous infliction of suffering” and as 
such not tolerated by the Eighth Amendment.175  
This doctrine that constitutionally legitimate 
punishment must respect limits is well grounded in the Court’s 
Eighth Amendment precedents; yet the bite of the doctrine 
seems to elude some critics of the Lackey claim, perhaps in part 
because judges sympathetic to Lackey claims use emotionally 
and morally charged terms to describe long tenure on death 
row—terms like “dehumanizing,”176 “horrible,”177 and “frightful.”178 
These usages may invite dismissal as merely expressing 
personal moral repugnance. Justice Thomas, for example, 
responds dismissively to what he takes to be a misplaced focus 
on the suffering of the long incarcerated condemned rather than 
the gruesome suffering inflicted by the justly condemned.179 But 
  
 172 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1976). 
 173 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 441. 
 174 Deterrence is invoked but not extensively treated in the Lackey opinions. 
Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1046. In Atkins, Justice Stevens acknowledges the controversy and 
uncertainty that swirls around arguments about whether the death penalty deters, and 
suggests that judgments about deterrence should be left to legislatures. Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-19 (2002). 
 175 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). 
 176 Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1046 n.* (Stevens, J.) (quoting People v. Anderson, 493 
P.2d 880, 894 (Cal. 1972)). 
 177 Id. (quoting In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890)). 
 178 Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 288-89 (1972)). 
 179 Justice Thomas gives a detailed description of the extensive torture inflicted 
on a murder victim by Lackey petitioner William Lee Thompson and his codefendant:  
Justice Stevens altogether refuses to take into consideration the gruesome 
nature of the crimes that legitimately lead States to authorize the death 
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the Lackey claimant is not contesting the constitutionality of 
capital punishment as retribution for cruelly taking life. Justice 
Thomas’s rejoinder misses that the Lackey claimant is arguing, 
and to this extent correctly, that the Eighth Amendment 
imposes limits on punishment even on those most deserving of 
punishment. The Eighth Amendment would not, for example, 
allow a state to inflict drawing and quartering, or the burning of 
entrails while alive, as the prelude to or the method of execution 
regardless of how hideous the crime or how cruel the criminal. 
To meet Lackey proponents on the ground on which they are 
arguing, the proper rejoinder must include an argument that 
decades-plus-death is not excessive punishment for the worst 
murders or the worst murderers in the light of contemporary 
standards of decency.  
Another example of a misleading rejoinder is that of 
Judge Kozinski in the Ninth Circuit’s Mackenzie v. Day,180 a 
case that raises a Lackey claim. Judge Kozinski wrote, “By and 
large, the delay in carrying out death sentences has been of 
benefit to death row inmates, allowing them to extend their 
lives,” and pursue various forms of legal relief or 
commutation.181 Intuitively, there is certainly something to be 
said for remaining in life as well as for the chance for relief 
from a death sentence. However, Judge Kozinski implicitly 
compared death plus delay with the prospect of prompt 
execution. Justice Stevens has concluded that delay in 
executions is “inescapable”182 in our death-penalty system. If 
Stevens is correct—and history to date certainly bears him 
out—the proper way to frame the Eighth Amendment issue is 
  
penalty and juries to impose it. The facts of this case illustrate the point. On 
March 30, 1976, petitioner and his codefendant were in a motel room with the 
victim and another woman. They instructed the women to contact their 
families to obtain money. The victim made the mistake of promising that she 
could obtain $200 to $300; she was able to secure only $25. Enraged, 
petitioner’s codefendant ordered her into the bedroom, removed his chain 
belt, forced her to undress, and began hitting her in the face while petitioner 
beat her with the belt. They then rammed a chair leg into her vagina, tearing 
its inner wall and causing internal bleeding; they repeated the process with a 
nightstick. Petitioner and his codefendant then tortured her with lit 
cigarettes and lighters and forced her to eat her sanitary napkin and to lick 
spilt beer off the floor. All the while, they continued to beat her with the 
chain belt, the club, and the chair leg. They stopped the attack once to force 
the victim to again call her mother to ask for money. After the call, petitioner 
and his codefendant resumed the torture until the victim died. 
Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1302 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 180 McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1995).  
 181 Id. at 1467. 
 182 Thompson, 129 S. Ct. at 1300.  
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not as a choice between dispatch and delay, but whether or not 
decades-plus-death (the system we have had for thirty years) is 
excessively retributive. Perhaps for many of the condemned, 
periodic torture would be preferable to certain and immediate 
death, but that does not render torture plus death a sentence 
that would survive Eighth Amendment review. Again in the 
Ninth Circuit, Judge Fletcher, sympathetic to the Lackey claim, 
evokes the life on death row of a Lackey claimant who has 
served twenty-three years on death row: 
For twenty-three years, Ceja has suffered the anxiety of impending 
death and the greatly restricted activity allowed death row inmates. 
During that time, Ceja has had an execution date set at least five 
times: February 8, 1978; September 24, 1980; May 11, 1983; December 
19, 1984; and January 21, 1998. For 23 years, Ceja has lived in 
solitary confinement, much of it in the typical death row cell on Cell 
Block 6 at the Arizona State Prison in Florence. Those cells are little 
more than a 7’ x 10’ windowless concrete box with a metal sink and 
toilet and a concrete slab for a bed. Activity outside that cell is 
typically limited to 3 one-to-two hour periods per week in which the 
inmate may shower or exercise. Visitations and phone privileges are 
much more limited than those for the general prison population. Many 
of a death row inmate’s neighbors are deeply disturbed men 
responsible for some of the most notorious murders in Arizona.183 
When Justices Stevens or Breyer called attention to 
such severe privations and anxieties, it would miss the Eighth 
Amendment point to dismiss their sympathy for the Lackey 
claim as merely an expression of their personal repugnance 
contemplating the suffering of the condemned. In Lackey v. 
Texas, Justice Stevens sketched the argument that after 
seventeen years awaiting death, the length of Lackey’s death 
row incarceration, there was little or no additional deterrent or 
retributive value to be achieved by executing him and hence no 
Eighth Amendment justification for execution.184 Let us suppose 
for the sake of argument that Justice Stevens underestimated 
the deterrent or retributive value and overestimates the 
suffering, exacted from Lackey in seventeen years, such that the 
commutation of his sentence to life imprisonment would cheat 
justice and the hangman. Suppose a prisoner were sentenced to 
die at twenty and executed at sixty after having spent forty years 
on death row. Suppose a person sentenced at thirty is executed at 
seventy-five. It is difficult to resist, once it is acknowledged that 
the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
  
 183 Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1998).  
 184 Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045-46 (1995). 
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is a doctrine of limitation, that a limit beyond which deterrence is 
exhausted and retribution is excessive has been reached at some 
number of years under sentence of death. The method of 
calculating the Eighth Amendment limit may not be easily 
agreed upon. Indeed, the line drawn may well be to some extent 
arbitrary, if no more arbitrary and debatable than maximum 
sentences for noncapital crimes. An unavoidable degree of 
arbitrariness and disagreement does not relieve the Supreme 
Court of the duty to set limits, which the longest serving death 
row inmates have surely exceeded.185 
In addition to the critical matter of excessive 
punishment, the opinions of Justices Stevens and Breyer in the 
Lackey cases advance two further arguments for hearing and 
indeed granting Lackey petitions that the Court has endorsed 
in its capital exclusion cases. 
b. The Long Delay Departs from the Traditional 
Practice Sanctioned by the Constitution 
Capital punishment is sanctioned by the U.S. 
Constitution186 and is enshrined in its text.187 However, to the 
extent that the institutions and practices of the late eighteenth 
century remain guides to constitutionality today,188 no such 
provenance can be claimed for periods of a decade or more 
awaiting execution or reduction of sentence. The practice of 
executing within “days or weeks”189 cannot justify the 
contemporary national average of twelve years (or even that of 
the most efficient state, Virginia at 5.4 years190), much less 
within two and three decades. Of course, the anti-Lackey jurist 
replies that contemporary review processes produce these 
  
 185 Lackey petitioner William Lee Thompson, for example, had been on death row 
for thirty-two years when his petition was denied in 2009. Thompson, 129 S. Ct. at 1303-04. 
 186 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (“We now hold that the 
punishment of death does not invariably violate the Constitution.”). 
 187 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, 
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual 
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”). 
 188 “Evolving standards of decency” determine the extent to which historic 
practices not deemed “cruel and usual” heretofore continue to pass Eighth Amendment 
muster. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-101 (1958). 
 189 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995 (Breyer, J.). 
 190 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2009, supra note 18, at 19 tbl.18.  
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delays and that prisoners exploit them. But the bare fact that 
capital punishment has been so constrained by due process as 
to require long intervals between condemnation and execution 
does not satisfactorily answer the question of whether such 
delays should be considered unconstitutionally cruel. They 
cannot be justified as sanctioned by tradition imported from 
England, or by the worldview of the Founders, or by American 
practice prior to the late twentieth century. Decades of 
uncertainty and waiting were unknown within the tradition. 
c. Long Delay Lacks the Legitimacy of Legislative 
Enactment  
A related argument is that the decades-plus-death 
sentence lacks the legitimacy of legislative enactment. No 
American legislature has ever authorized this penalty. A 
rejoinder to this argument is that no legislature has enacted 
legislation prohibiting the execution of the long serving. In Ceja 
v. Stewart, Judge Fletcher offers an explanation for this lack of 
positive endorsement: “There has never been such a sentence 
imposed in this country—or any other, to my knowledge. 
Neither Arizona nor any other state would ever enact a law 
calling for such a punishment.”191 The argument about 
constitutional tradition and the argument about legislation are 
related in that both criticize decades-plus-death on the grounds 
that it is an artifact of the contemporary death-penalty system 
devoid of the legitimacy that emanates from deliberate choice 
or acknowledgement within political processes. 
d. The Repudiation of Execution Long Delayed by 
Foreign and International Courts 
The Supreme Court’s openness to the persuasive force of 
the decisions of foreign and international courts is a thread 
that runs through its Eighth Amendment capital 
jurisprudence. In the most extensive discussion of foreign and 
international law in its Lackey cases,192 Justice Breyer 
canvasses the “growing number of courts outside the United 
States . . . that accept or assume the lawfulness of the death 
penalty”193 that have held that delay is a factor which may 
  
 191 Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 192 Knight, 528 U.S. at 995-97. 
 193 Id. at 995. 
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render execution inhuman, degrading and cruel. “[P]articularly 
instructive” are the opinions of nations that share our legal 
traditions.194 Famously, the Judicial Committee of the Jamaican 
Privy Council imposed a strict five-year limit on the length of 
detention after which execution was no longer legal.195 Justice 
Breyer also noted that the Supreme Court of India requires 
that delay must be taken into account in sentencing196 and the 
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe197 bans execution outright in the 
case of delay.198 He expressed concern that the decision199 of the 
European Court of Human Rights prohibiting extradition 
because of long delay, the so-called “death row syndrome,” is 
cruel treatment prohibited by the European Convention on 
Human Rights will be followed by other international and 
national courts as periods of delay grow longer on U.S. death 
rows.200 This proved a prescient concern in that Canada’s 
Supreme Court subsequently ruled in part because of long 
death row delays that Canada would no longer extradite 
persons facing the death penalty to the United States.201 
International law and foreign law, particularly 
European law and the law of the former Commonwealth 
nations with which we share a legal tradition, offer a measure 
of support to the Lackey claim in that the three most recent 
capital exclusion cases, Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy, all find 
foreign and international jurisprudence helpful in resolving 
Eighth Amendment questions. 
VII. LACKEY-FOR-THE-ELDERLY 
Justices Stevens and Breyer have shown that sound 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence supports the Lackey claim. 
Nevertheless, the Lackey claim has not won further overt 
support on the Court in the more than fifteen years since 
Clarence Lackey’s petition for certiorari was denied. The Court 
has refused certiorari to petitioners with nearly twice Lackey’s 
  
 194 Id. at 997. 
 195 Pratt & Morgan v. Attorney General for Jamaica, [1993] 1 A.C. 1, 29 (P.C.) 
(appeal taken from Jam.).  
 196 Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 465 (India). 
 197 Catholic Commission for Peace & Justice in Zimbabwe v. Attorney General 
[1993], 1 ZIMB. L. R. 239.240 269(S) (Aug. 4, 1999). 
 198 Knight, 528 U.S. at 995-96.  
 199 Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989). 
 200 Knight, 528 U.S. at 996. 
 201 United States v. Burns, [2001] S.C.R. 283 (Can.). 
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seventeen-year tenure on death row.202 Perhaps it is time for the 
more modest proposal of Lackey relief for the elderly. A petition 
for an elderly inmate marshals all the support for the general 
Lackey claim and builds on the special claims of the aged. It 
trades on the modest scale of the reform it requires. 
It should be clear at the outset that the issue raised by 
the elderly claim is not the death sentence meted out upon 
conviction but whether it is constitutional to continue to subject 
persons who have achieved old age on death row to the threat of 
execution after long delay from the time of condemnation. If 
properly convicted and sentenced after the commission of a 
capital crime, it is assumed that the elderly of death row were 
culpable and eligible for capital punishment. What then 
distinguishes the elderly of death row from their younger peers?  
I have argued that the elderly ought to be relieved of 
continuing to live in death row conditions whether or not they 
remain under threat of execution. Whether or not relieved of 
death row conditions of confinement, the elderly will have 
logged long detention in all but the most extraordinary cases of 
late-life conviction. If we continue to permit death row 
conditions for the elderly, their fragility due to aging processes 
and death row incarceration argue that their excess suffering 
renders their execution an acute violation of Eighth 
Amendment retribution norms. If they have been spared some 
years of death row incarceration, the prolongation of the ordeal 
of waiting for execution should be sufficient to exceed tolerable 
retributive standards. This argument rests on the proposition 
that frailty makes such forms of stress too intense to pass Eighth 
Amendment muster. The decision to spare the elderly from 
execution would be an application of a recognized protective norm 
systematically respected in society. The elderly are exempted 
wholly or in part from social obligations such as labor and 
military service on the basis of their frailty.  
We do not expect persons in the decline of old age to meet 
the challenges posed to those in the prime of life; we exempt and 
protect the old as we do the young. Leroy Nash at ninety-three 
or Clarence Ray Allen at seventy-six were guilty of heinous 
crimes and served many years before their deaths.203 Yet the 
  
 202 See, e.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541 (2009) (denying certiorari to 
petitioner who had been on death row for twenty-nine years); Knight, 528 U.S. 990 
(denying certiorari to petitioner who had been on death row for twenty-five years).  
 203 Nash served twenty-seven years on death row before his death in 2010. Paul 
Rubin, Nation’s Oldest Death Row Inmate Will Never Be Executed, PHOENIX NEW TIMES 
(Dec. 4, 2008), http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2008-12-04/news/nation-s-oldest-death-
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specter of executing the demented and the multiply disabled 
aged shames us by violating a protective norm. They may 
deserve execution but they are no longer fit for execution. The 
Eighth Amendment significance of old age under condemnation 
is therefore not about acknowledging an evolution in values but 
rather recognizing that familiar values have become salient 
because of changes in the institution of capital punishment. 
CONCLUSION 
The long delays between pronouncement of sentence 
and execution, and the considerable uncertainty about whether 
any condemned man or woman will be executed in our system 
of capital punishment, have given rise to a new form of cruelty 
unknown to our ancestors. Delay is not aberrant but normal. It 
cannot be purged from the system without doing unacceptable 
violence to constitutionally mandated due process. It cannot be 
reduced without money for representation and court resources 
that have not been allocated to this purpose and will not be 
forthcoming. If the general Lackey claim is a victim of its 
consequences, perhaps we can manage a modest special case, 
Lackey-for-the-Elderly.  
  
row-inmate-will-never-be-executed/. Allen served twenty-three years on death row before 
his execution in 2006. Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2006).  
